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MARSHALING MAPP:
JUSTICE TOM CLARK'S ROLE IN
MAPP V. OHIo'S EXTENSION OF THE
EXCLUSIONARY RULE TO STATE
SEARCHES AND SEIZURES1
Dennis D. Dorint
INTRODUCTION
Over a decade after Mapp v. Ohio,2 its author reflected upon
Gideon v. Wainwright.3 Epochal holdings like Gideon, Justice Tom
Clark observed:
do not come out of a blue sky like individual thunderbolts,
but resemble more closely a cyclone dipping to earth from
time to time to lift aloft in its cone many man-made objects
until it is filled to the brim; then it casually releases its whole
burden, which falls to the earth in bizarre fashion, often
leaving never-forgotten landmarks. Gideon is such a land-
mark.
This article is derived from Dennis D. Dorin, Seize the Time: Justice Tom Clark's Role
in Mapp v. Ohio, in LAW AND THE LEGAL PROCESS 21-72 (V. Swigert ed. 1982). A preliminary
word about some of the sources referred to in this article is necessary. The seminars and inter-
views with Justices Clark and Potter Stewart drawn upon so heavily at its beginning were, un-
fortunately, not tape-recorded. Allusions are also frequently made to Justice Clark's private
Supreme Court papers. Clark gave me full access to them during the summers of 1974-75,
when they were in a raw form in file cabinets in his U.S. Supreme Court Building storerooms.
The great bulk of the Justice's records was transferred to the University of Texas's Tarlton Law
Library after his death. My strong guess is that all, if not a great deal, of these materials are now
duly available to researchers at Tarlton. I know, for example, that Justice Clark told me, in the
mid-1970s, a few years before his death, that that was his intention. However, there is no guar-
antee that every scrap of material from them did in fact reach this destination.
t Professor Emeritus, The University of North Carolina at Charlotte. A series of UNC-
Charlotte reassignments of duties and summer fellowships underwrote the research into Justice
Clark's decision-making encompassing this analysis.
2 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
3 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
4 Tom C. Clark, Gideon Revisited, 15 ARIZ. L. REV. 343,344 (1973).
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And so is Clark's Mapp holding. Few Supreme Court decisions
have been as far-reaching, or as controversial, as Mapp's declaration
that "[a]ll evidence obtained by searches and seizures in violation of
the Federal Constitution is inadmissible" in state criminal trials. The
intellectual process that attended Mapp's creation, moreover, was
very much the ragged and chaotic-the "cyclonic"-one that Clark
had seen in Gideon's origins.
Gideon and Mapp shared another parallel. Each seemed to em-
body the very heart of what its author believed were the imperatives
of the judicial function. Few cases could have surpassed Gideon in
symbolizing Hugo Black's jurisprudence. 6 Similarly, Mapp's search
and seizure ruling was a direct product of Clark's extraordinary ac-
tions-ones that, in turn, were substantially structured and channeled
by a conception of a justice's role to which Clark, perhaps uniquely,
adhered. Seldom in the Court's history had one of its members so
"seized the time"7 to change the very issues of the case before him in
order to marshal8 the Court into a fundamental doctrinal change. Yet,
in so doing, Clark still followed the rules that he, at least, considered
substantial limitations upon his discretion.
In critical ways, Mapp also involved collaboration between
Clark and Black, who became the pivotal justice in Clark's strategy to
transform Dollree Mapp's relatively simple obscenity case into one of
the most important search and seizure cases ever decided.9
5 Mapp, 367 U.S. at 643.
6 See, for example, ANTHONY LEWIS, GIDEON'S TRUMPET (1964), which explores a case
with which Justice Black scholars tend very closely to identify him.
7 See Dorin, supra note 1, at 21 (arguing that Clark's commitment to the precepts of his
role as a justice shaped the events that led to the decision in Mapp).
8 For the purpose of this article, we might define "marshal" as "to put or set in order,"
"organize," "line up," "shepherd," "guide," or "lead." See THE SYNONYM FINDER 709 (1978).
9 See, e.g., FRED P. GRAHAM, THE DUE PROCESS REVOLUTION: THE WARREN COURT'S
IMPACT ON CRIMINAL LAW 28, 155 (1970) (discussing the background behind such important
Supreme Court cases as Mapp, Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), and United States v.
Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967)); DAVID M. O'BRIEN, STORM CENTER: THE SUPREME COURT IN
AMERICAN POLITICS 359 (2000) (discussing how the Supreme Court deals with political contro-
versy through such decisions); LUCAS A. POWE, JR., THE WARREN COURT AND AMERICAN
POLITICS 195-99 (2000) (describing the positions of the four justices, Black, Douglas, Warren,
and Brennan, whom Clark needed to ensure a five-to-four majority in Mapp); OTIS H.
STEPHENS, JR. & JOHN M. SCHEB IX, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 851 (1993) (describing
the Warren Court's revolution in the area of criminal justice); Dennis J. Hutchinson, Felix
Frankfurter and the Business of the Supreme Court, 0. T. 1946 - 0. T. 1961, 1980 SUP. CT.
REV. 143, 198 (stating that Mapp was the most important case in the Warren Court's federaliza-
tion of state criminal procedure).
According to Bernard Schwartz, former Supreme Court Justice Abe Fortas once re-
ferred to Mapp as "the most radical decision in recent times." BERNARD SCHWARTZ, SUPER
CHIEF: EARL WARREN AND HIS SUPREME COURT-A JUDICIAL BIOGRAPHY 391 (1983).
Schwartz himself found the Mapp case to be one "of the most significant cases" of the Warren
era. Id. at 388.
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How, then, did Clark's and Black's very different, and frequently
conflicting, interpretations of a justice's proper role and the law com-
bine, through their behind-the-scenes give-and-takes, to trigger
Mapp's historic "cyclone"?
I. JUSTICE CLARK'S ROLE CONCEPTION
Tom Clark's leading role in the Mapp case was deeply grounded
in his conception of the judicial function. He had been a member of
the Court for a dozen years by the time Mapp came before him. In
later years, he would frequently maintain that he had only achieved a
real sense of confidence as a justice after he had served his first five.
By then, he contended, he had adopted a set of normative principles
that he believed were viable limitations upon what he saw as his po-
tentially enormous powers. Reduced to their fundamentals, he main-
tained, these principles encompassed three rules.
First, central to his approach to cases was his conviction that
obedience to the law was the foundation, even the "salvation," of the
American constitutional system. 10  Civil rights and liberties could
never be protected in a lawless society. Hence, when a court made its
decision, everyone, even those conscientiously opposed to its conclu-
sions, was bound by it.
For Clark, "everyone" included judges and justices. These offi-
cials symbolized the law in the eyes of the citizenry. They were "the
present embodiment of [the community's] ideal of justice."11 They
should never, therefore, show a contempt for or indifference to the
law. Yet, in Clark's mind, that was precisely what a judge or a justice
did when he or she dissented term after term from his or her court's
application of one of its doctrines. Through such an action, a United
States Supreme Court justice defied its precedents-thereby holding
himself or herself above the law. 12
10 See Justice Tom C. Clark, Remarks at an American University Washington Semester
Seminar at the United States Supreme Court Building in Washington, D.C. (May 18, 1971)
[hereinafter Clark's May 18th, 1971 Remarks] (on file with author).
Students of the U.S. Supreme Court's decision-making may well want to compare and
contrast the portrait of Clark developed in this essay with FORREST MAL1i2MAN, JAMES F.
SPRIGGS II & PAUL J. WAHLBECK, CRAFrING LAW ON THE SUPREME COURT (2000), a highly-
acclaimed, cutting-edge analysis of the Burger Court. See also Cornell W. Clayton, Book Re-
view, 95 AM. POL Sa. REv. 1001 (2001). CRAFrNG LAW ON THE SUPREME COURT has just
won the Ameican Political Science Association's C. Herman Prichett Award for the best book
on law and courts written by a political scientist during 2000. See Organized Sections Distrib-
ute Awards at 2001 Meeting, 34 P-S POL SCI. AND POLITICS 895, 895 (2001).
11 Interview with Justice Tom C. Clark on Meet the Press, Washington, D.C. (NBC televi-
sion broadcast, Apr. 19, 1970) (transcript on file with author).
12 See Clark's May 18, 1971 Remarks, supra note 10.
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For this reason, Clark explained, he had developed his "no sub-
sequent dissent" rule.13  He would only dissent from a case with
which he disagreed during the term in which it was established.
Technically, it was then still under his Court's jurisdiction. But after
that time, it was the law of the land and he, as any other citizen, was
bound by it. He had no choice but to apply it to future cases.14
Of course, he conceded, this principle was hardly embraced by
all of his brethren. Justices whom he considered legal giants rejected
it. Hugo Black, for one, refused to follow it. When Black thought a
precedent was wrong, he gave himself the option of dissenting every
time the Court applied it. Clark respected such a stand. "Hugo
thought he ought to preserve his position," he observed. 15 "He be-
lieved that if you no longer dissented, you couldn't maintain your
identity" as a rallying point for allies. 16 Nevertheless, Clark could not
embrace Black's stand. When a member of the Court carried over a
dissent from term to term, he was "like a bull in a china shop," caus-
ing "more dissension than ever."'17 "I'm a simple guy," he pro-
claimed, and "I'm not above the law."18
Second, this approach did not, however, require Clark to adhere
blindly to past precedents. From his first days on the Court, he had
expounded the view that the law was "an agency of our society, to be
shaped with conscious recognition of the interests of those whom it
must serve." 19 He had always considered the resolution of cases a
"dynamic process" that required a deliberate "adjustment of legal
[principles] to change." 20
13 This term is the author's. Justice Clark did not have a specific name for this precept.14 See Justice Tom C. Clark, Remarks at an American University Washington Semester
Seminar at the United States Supreme Court Building in Washington, D.C. (May 5, 1970) [here-
inafter Clark's May 5th, 1970 Remarks] (on file with author) ("Even when I dissent I feel like
I'm bound by the opinion ever since. The case is already the law of the land and you haven't
any business dissenting from it.").
1- Interview by Dennis D. Dorin with Justice Tom C. Clark in Washington, D.C. (Aug.
15, 1973) [hereinafter Clark Interview] (on file with author).
16 id.
17 Id
18 Id.
Of course, Black's position was that he had taken his oath as a justice to defend and
support the Constitution, not what he considered Supreme Court misinterpretations of it. And
he took this so seriously, Justice Potter Stewart informed the author, that in his later years, he
would not join an opinion by another justice until that colleague removed from it all citations
approving previous holdings from which Black had and still dissented. See Interview by Dennis
D. Dorin with Justice Potter Stewart, Washington, D.C. (Nov. 13, 1981) [hereinafter Stewart
Interview] (on file with author). See also MARK SILVERSTEIN, CONSTITUTIONAL FAITHS-
FELIX FRANKFURTER, HUGO BLACK, AND THE PROCESS OF JUDICIAL DECISIONMAKING 20
(1984) (comparing and contrasting Black's and Frankfurter's conceptions of their judicial roles).
19 Tom C. Clark, Dynamic Process, 13 TEX. B.J. 409,410 (1950).
20 Id. at 411.
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Hence, if Clark found a precedent unsound, he could rightfully
seek to overturn it. He could, as previously noted, dissent from it dur-
ing the term in which it was established. Then he could attack it yet
again as he concurred in its application to future cases. And, of far-
reaching importance, he could work behind-the-scenes at the Court to
persuade at least four other justices to overrule it. His "no subsequent
dissent" rule was in no way violated if he marshaled a majority in
support of a decision, and opinion, that overturned one rule and set up
another. This course of action would not flout, but would simply
change, the law.
Third, Clark asserted that it was one thing to overrule a prece-
dent in explicit terms and quite another to do so by implication. A
justice should never misconstrue purposely, and thus deliberately wa-
ter down, precedents. Such a tactic was intellectually dishonest. It
might also actually diffuse and deflect attempts to eradicate destruc-
tive cases. "If a law is a bad one and you enforce it strictly," he ad-
vised, "you'll get rid of it more quickly."
22
Additionally, the Court had the responsibility to overturn past
cases in clear terms. Certainty in legal rules was essential if they
were to be enforced fairly and effectively. For this reason, every jus-
tice had a duty to write opinions that clearly defined the Court's doc-
trines. A confused, unduly complex or subtle, or otherwise ambigu-
ous holding signaled a justice's failure to fulfill this obligation. Jus-
tices would have the opportunity of positively influencing the gov-
ernmental system only so long as their treatment of cases embodied
this precision. "I've heard people say that it's pretty severe when you
overrule cases, so how about softening the blow?" Clark observed,
"But I'd rather overrule them more forthrightly. I believe in going
ahead and cutting the Gordian knot. Why prolong the agony?" 3
In a significant number of instances, though, the imperatives of
the second and third orientations proved incompatible. In accordance
with the former, Clark needed not only the votes of four of his fellow
Justices, but also their signatures on his opinion, in order to overrule a
past rule and establish a new one. But the price for one or more such
allies might well be violations of his third principle. He might well
have to dilute, or blur, a prospective majority holding. Intellectual
purity might, therefore, have to defer to compromise. At such a junc-
ture, Clark would have to calculate how much ambiguity he could
permit an additional signature to cost him.
21 See Clark's May 5, 1970 Remarks, supra note 14.
2 id.
23 Clark Interview, supra note 15.
20011
CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
Nowhere was his acceptance of this reality better expressed then
in his description of the "Clark Method" of securing another justice's
signature. He would always try to be alert to a brother's possible un-
certainty during the Court's secret conference discussions. "If an-
other Justice said something like 'I'm inclined to affirm,"' he related,
"you knew you had a much better chance [of persuading him] to your
side." 24 "I'd let him simmer for a few days," Clark recounted, "then I
would type up my own first draft and personally bring it over. 'Well,'
I would say, 'it's just the first try. It's rough. I remember what you
said at the conference; I think this agrees with it. But go through it
and see if there is something else I might put in it that would appeal toyou.'"25
In such a way, he recalled, "I would try to get a man even if I
had to give [up] a sentence or paragraph. I was one to think that the
6-3's sounded better than the 5-4's. They not only sounded better;
they had more force! '26 Generally, the more justices endorsing an
opinion, the higher the chances not only that it would be retained, but
that it would be implemented.
II. CLARK AND STATE SEARCHES AND SEIZURES BEFORE MAPP V.
OHIo (1949-61)
A. Options
At the time of Justice Clark's appointment, the corpus of search
and seizure law to which he might have applied such principles was
hardly well settled, and the dimension relating to state searches and
seizures was especially fragile. The Supreme Court's supervision of
search and seizure law had begun only a few months before, with its
six-to-three landmark decision in Wolfv. Colorado.27 In Wolf, Justice
Frankfurter's majority opinion had proclaimed that the "security of
one's privacy against arbitrary intrusion by the police" was "at the
core of the Fourth Amendment" and therefore "implicit in the 'con-
cept of ordered liberty' safeguarded against state infringement by the
Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause.28
The enforcement of this constitutional "right to privacy," how-
ever, he concluded, was largely the states' responsibility. It was pro-
tected in the United States courts by Weeks v. United States,29 which
excluded, inter alia, the fruits of unreasonable searches and seizures
24 id.
25 id.
26 id.
27 338 U.S. 25 (1949).
2' Id. at 27.
29 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
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by federal law enforcement officers from prosecutions against their
victims. But Weeks' doctrine was not required by the Fourth
Amendment. It had been formulated as an exercise of the Court's
supervisory power over the federal judiciary, a prerogative that it did
not have over state courts. The Court was thus neither authorized nor
obliged "dogmatically" to impose the Weeks rule upon state judiciar-
ies. Indeed, most of the English-speaking world had not found an
exclusionary rule an "essential ingredient of the right [to privacy]. 30
And the states' lack of agreement as to its advisability was "particu-
larly impressive." Thirty-one had rejected it; only sixteen had
adopted it.
31
The Court's 1949 refusal to extend Weeks to the states hardly
settled the issue, however. Wolf became only the prelude to over a
decade of attempts by civil rights and liberties groups, defense attor-
neys, and defendants to induce it to reverse its stand. In the vanguard
of this movement were the Wolf dissenters, Justices Murphy,
Rutledge, and Douglas. The Weeks rule, they argued through a Mur-
phy dissent, was a constitutional requirement. It alone provided suf-
ficient protection of the Fourth Amendment's "right to privacy."
Only by exclusion could the judiciary impress "upon the zealous
prosecutor" that violations of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments
would "do him no good. 32 Only when that point was driven home
could he be expected to "emphasize the importance of observing" the
Constitution's commands when instructing police officers.33
B. Irvine v. California
After nearly five years on the Court, Clark had not authored an
opinion supporting either Frankfurter's or Murphy's position. Never-
theless, his votes suggested that he adhered to the Wolf case. In
Schwartz v. Texas,34 for example, he let Douglas stand alone in his
contention that Weeks' exclusion of the fruits of unreasonable
searches and seizures should be extended to the states. And in Rochin
v. California,35 Clark again failed to respond to Douglas's call. On
the contrary, he joined Rochin's majority, in its attempt, via another
Frankfurter opinion, to develop a corollary to Wolf-the "shock the
conscience' test. Confronted with the California authorities' forcible
pumping of Rochin's stomach for evidence, he endorsed the Court's
30 Wolf, 338 U.S. at 29.
31 See id.
32 Id. at 44.
33 Id.
34 344 U.S. 199 (1952).
35 342 U.S. 165 (1952).
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new doctrine: convictions based upon the fruits of state law enforce-
ment tactics that "shock[ed] the conscience," offended "even hard-
ened sensibilities," and were "too close to the rack and the screw to
permit of constitutional differentiation," were void as violations of the
Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause.36
Coming two years after Rochin, however, Irvine v. California37
suddenly revealed fundamental disagreements between Clark and
Frankfurter concerning the very nature of the Fourth and Fourteenth
Amendments. California police, suspecting Irvine of gambling of-
fenses, had secretly, and illegally, entered his home three times, set-
ting up and adjusting electronic surveillance devices through which,
while eavesdropping for over a month on Irvine's and his wife's most
intimate privacies, they had secured the evidence against him.
38
For Frankfurter, these actions were obviously sufficient, under
Rochin, to "shock the conscience." Wolf had never held that every-
thing secured by state law enforcement officials, no matter how ob-
tained, was admissible in state courts choosing to accept it. Due
process set limits upon what the state could introduce into a prosecu-
tion, and in Irvine, California had far exceeded them.
39
The Court's secret conference vote revealed, though, that the
new Chief Justice, Earl Warren, as well as Justices Reed, Jackson,
Clark, and Minton, saw Irvine very differently. Rochin, they asserted,
only excluded the fruits of searches and seizures involving police bru-
tality.4°
Perhaps Clark, however, Frankfurter speculated, might be per-
suaded to reconsider. "Dear Tom:" he wrote him, "this is a word ad-
dressed to you in particular because of the views which you alone
expressed at Conference about the problem in this case.' '41 "Your
position, as I understood it," Frankfurter recalled, "was that you are
prepared to overrule Wolf v. Colorado, but if that is not to be done
then you would apply Wolf'-thereby affirming Irvine's conviction.42
16 Id. at 209-10.
37 347 U.S. 128 (1954).
'8 See id. at 130-31, 145 (discussing the facts of the case).
39 See id. at 142-49 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
40 See id. at 133 (distinguishing Irvine from Rochin because it did not "involve coercion,
violence or brutality to the person, but rather a trespass to property, plus eavesdropping").
41 Memorandum from Justice Frankfurter to Justice Clark 1 (Dec. 29, 1953). This mode
of citation will apply to all subsequent references to the Justice Tom C. Clark Supreme Court
Papers available in the latter's personal files at the U.S. Supreme Court Building from 1974-75.
Since then, the Clark Supreme Court Papers have been catalogued for scholarly use at the Uni-
versity of Texas School of Law Tarlton Law Library. Please check there initially; the author
also has a copy or notes of the referenced items.
42 Id.
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But "[w]ill you not agree," Frankfurter entreated, "that Irvine is
not precisely WolfU? 43 Of course, the Wolf case could be stretched so
broadly that it would permit any relevant evidence, no matter how
obtained, to be introduced at trial. But that, he asserted, was not what
Wolf had decided. For Wolf to govern Irvine, Clark "would have to
extend Wolf and not merely apply it." Frankfurter's memorandum
closed with a statement designed to dramatize what, for him, was the
absurdity of Clark's position:
Because I do not want to overrule Wolf does not require me
to extend it. A fortiori, it surely is not incumbent upon you,
who do not like Wolf, to extend the area of its undesirability,
in your eyes, because not enough people will go with you to
remove that area altogether. Because one does not like a de-
cision but feels he must respect it, is hardly a reason for en-
larging what one does not [like.] I know there are some
Catholics who are more Catholic than the Pope. You do not
have to be more Wo/f-ish than Wolf.45
Clark had thus attempted to invoke his "no subsequent dissent"
rule during the Court's conference. But Frankfurter was arguing that,
no matter how valid such an approach might be in some instances, it
was inapplicable to this one because neither Wolf nor Rochin trig-
gered it.
Clark was not persuaded. Indeed, in a circulation only to Justice
Jackson, who was then attempting to author a majority opinion, he
excoriated Wolf's refusal to extend the exclusionary rule to the states.
And Clark had nothing good to say about Frankfurter's version of
Rochin either, which he dismissed as so vacuous and subjective as not
to meet even the minimum standards for an effective promulgation of
the law.
Clark went still further, threatening even to violate his "no sub-
sequent dissent" rule. Frankfurter and Burton, based upon the for-
mer's rendition of Rochin, were going to vote to vitiate Irvine's con-
viction. Black, with Douglas's support, wanted to do so on self-
incrimination grounds. Now Clark was warning Jackson that he
might well give these Justices their crucial fifth vote by joining Doug-
las's plea that Wolf's refusal to require exclusion by the states be
overturned.46
43 ad
4 id.
45 Id. at 2.
46 See Justice Tom Clark, Irvine Opinion Draft 1-2 (Feb. 1953) (marked "File Copy");
supra note 41.
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In the end, though, Irvine would remain in prison. Jackson,
Warren, Reed, and Minton would hold that Rochin did not cover the
admittedly flagrant violation of rights to which the Irvines had been
subjected. The "shock-the-conscience" test, for them, was restricted
to instances in which defendants suffered physical violence or coer-
cion. To "extend" it to any searches and seizures "shocking" to a ma-
jority of the Justices at any particular time, they contended, would
leave Wolf so indefinite that no state would be able effectively to
mold its behavior by it.47
In a short sole concurrence, Clark explained why he was voting
with them--championing two positions that would, within the next
several years, become the law at least into the next century-that a
Fourth Amendment-based exclusion should be applied to the states
and that Rochin should be restricted to cases of official brutality.48
Parting company with all of his brothers except Douglas, Clark
made public for the first time that, had he been a member of the Wolf
Court, he would have voted to extend the exclusionary rule to all state
jurisdictions. But the majority had not chosen to do so then, and it
was holding to that decision in Irvine. Hence, in a clear recourse to
his "no subsequent dissent" rule, Clark had to concede that Wolf re-
mained "the law and, as such, [was] entitled to the respect of the
Court's membership."49
Therefore, unlike Douglas, and in direct contrast to what he had
threatened to do in his memorandum to Jackson, Clark would not use
Weeks to reverse Irvine's conviction. Although he found the police
tactics in Irvine to be outrageous, he like everyone else was bound by
Wolf. But, he noted prophetically, he invoked it with "great reluc-
tance," and hoped that strict adherence to its tenor would "produce
needed converts for its extinction."
50
This course had a substantial impact upon the law. Had Clark
voted for reversal, Jackson, Warren, Reed, and Minton would have
been overpowered by a curious majority. The world outside the
Court would have learned that Clark and Douglas were reversing on
the ground that Weeks should have been applied; that Black, with
Douglas, would do so voting on self-incrimination grounds; and that
Frankfurter and Burton were joining the others based upon their par-
ticular interpretation of Rochin.
Clark thus avoided such a doctrinal mishmash by means of a
concurrence that made it clear to the plethora of jurists, prosecutors,
47 Irvine, 347 U.S. at 129-38.
48 Id. at 138-39.
49 Id. at 138.
" Id. at 139.
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defense attorneys, law enforcement officials, and defendants who
looked to the Court for guidance that Wolf still prevailed, but that he,
as Douglas, invited its destruction.
Clark's refusal to embrace Frankfurter's interpretation of Rochin
had similar repercussions. Of course, he maintained, he could join
Frankfurter in what Clark saw as a movement to undermine Wolf by
implication. He could thus help to "sterilize" it by means of a policy
whereby a conviction would be reversed, and a guilty man would go
free, whenever five Justices were sufficiently revolted by the police
behavior that had secured the evidence against him. "But," he con-
cluded, such a strategy would make "for such uncertainty and unpre-
dictability that it would be impossible to foretell-other than by
guesswork-just how brazen the invasion of the intimate privacies of
one's home must be in order to shock itself into the protective arms of
the Constitution.
' 51
Such a course of action would not "shape the conduct of local
police one whit., 52 Clark reasoned that "[u]npredictable reversals on
dissimilar fact situations [were] not likely to curb the zeal of those
[law enforcement officials] who may be intent on racking up a high
percentage of successful prosecutions. 53  Clark had thus invoked
what he saw as his second and third precepts to limit Rochin only to
instances of physical coercion. By voting with the Jackson faction, he
thus provided its crucial fifth vote for the narrow rendition of "shock
the conscience."
Whether the Irvines appreciated such explicitness and symmetry
in the law is highly doubtful. Because of Clark's recourses to his
definition of his role, Irvine would not be getting a new trial, even
though every member of the Court believed that his constitutional
rights had been massively violated. Irvine marked the end of Clark's
close to five years of silence regarding state searches and seizures.
He had emerged as a major player in its resolution. Indeed, he had
been its "swing" Justice. Seven years later, he would unleash a "cy-
clone" which would overturn Wolfv. Colorado's refusal to extend the
exclusionary rule to the states.
51 Id. at 138.
52 Id.
53 Id.
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III. MARSHALING MAPP
A. An Easy Case?
Very few of the Supreme Court's cases could be described as
"easy." When Mapp v. Ohio54 arrived, however, it seemed an excep-
tion. Dollree Mapp had been convicted of violating an Ohio statute
that made the mere knowing possession of "obscene, lewd, or lascivi-
ous ' 55 materials a felony. Such a law, Miss Mapp's attorney, A. L.
Kearns, asserted during his oral argument before the Court, obviously
denied her the freedom of expression protected by the First and Four-
teenth Amendments. A majority of the justices of the Ohio Supreme
Court had already so held.56 The only reason his client's conviction
had not been reversed on this ground was because of a provision of
the Ohio Constitution that required the votes of six of its seven Jus-
tices before a state statute could be declared unconstitutional. 57 In
Mapp, only four members of the Ohio Supreme Court had voted to
strike down this legislation.58
However, Kearns did have some back-up arguments. He con-
tended, for example, that the search through which Ohio secured its
key evidence was unconstitutional. Particularly, when the circum-
stances of its intrusion on Ms. Mapp's privacy were considered, they
had to constitute the kind of police overreaching condemned by Ro-
chin.5
9
Justice Clark wanted to know, in particular, whether Kearns was
asking the Court to overturn Wolf v. Colorado.60 Kearns responded
that, having carefully gone over Wolf, he had decided that he should
rely upon it and Rochin.61 But, obviously, he was primarily basing
his case upon the freedom of expression issue. Indeed, the only inti-
mation that Mapp had anything at all to do with a possible overturn-
54 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
5' Id. at 643 n. 1.
56 See State v. Mapp, 166 N.E.2d 387, 390 (Ohio 1960) ("If such a legislative prohibition
of possession of books and papers is valid, it may discourage law abiding people from even
looking at books and pictures and thus interfere with the freedom of speech and press guaran-
teed by Articles I and XIV of the Amendments to the Constitution of the United States.").
5' See id. at 391 ("'No law shall be held unconstitutional and void by the Supreme Court
without the concurrence of at least all but one of the judges, except in the affirmance of the
judgment of the Court of Appeals declaring a law unconstitutional and void."') (quoting OHIO
CONST. art. IV, § 2).
58 See id. ("Since more than one of the judges of this court are of the opinion that no por-
tion of the statute upon which defendant's conviction was based is unconstitutional and void, the
judgment of the Court of Appeals must be affirmed.").
59 See RICHARD C. CORTNER & CLIFFORD M. LYTLE, MODERN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW:
COMMENTARY AND CASE STUDIES 128-30 (1971) (noting that Mapp's attorneys argued that the
police's conduct met Rochin's "shock the conscience" standard for exclusion).
60 338 U.S. 25 (1949).
61 See Clark Interview, supra note 15; Stewart Interview, supra note 18.
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ing of Wolf was contained in a few closing lines of an amicus brief
and an oral argument submitted by the American and Ohio Civil Lib-
erties Unions. The two groups had "respectfully request[ed] that [the]
Court re-examine [Wolf]"and conclude that "the ordered liberty con-
cept guaranteed to persons by the Due Process Clause ... necessarily
requires that evidence illegally obtained in violation thereof, not be
admissible in state criminal proceedings." 62
When the Court addressed the Mapp case in conference,
Kearns's First Amendment strategy seemed clearly to have prevailed.
The vote was nine-to-zero. Ohio, everyone agreed, had blatantly vio-
lated Mapp's right of free expression. How could a law survive that
made the mere knowing possession of obscene materials a felony?
During a term with plenty of controversy, and strong emotions, Mapp
seemed easy. Its opinion for the majority, which within the next few
days would be assigned by Warren to Clark, could be expected to be
somewhat routine.
B. From Obscenity to Search and Seizure
Responding to this assignment, Clark took legal pad and pen in
hand and began to sketch his opinion. The record showed, he noted,
that Ms. Mapp had challenged her conviction on two grounds. First,
she maintained, the allegedly obscene materials on her premises had
been seized in violation of the Fourth Amendment and, therefore,
should have been excluded from her trial. Second, she contended that
the statute under which she had been convicted violated the First and
Fourteenth Amendments.
On the search and seizure question, Clark observed, "the Court
adheres to its rule announced in Wolfv. Colorado... and hence this
contention of appellant is denied., 63 But her freedom of expression
claim was valid, and the case would be decided on that ground.
The next three pages detailed the facts. The Cleveland police
had broken into Miss Mapp's home. On the advice of her lawyer, she
had demanded to see their alleged warrant. An officer showed her
something on paper. She grabbed it from him and placed it in her
bosom. "A struggle ensued in which the officers took [it backj hand-
cuffed Miss Mapp and took her up to her bedroom." The second
and basement floors were searched-ultimately yielding the materials
that Ohio claimed were obscene. No warrant was ever produced at
trial, and whether it even existed appeared to be "under question." 65
62 CORTNER & LYTLE, supra note 59, at 129.
63 Justice Tom Clark, Mapp Opinion Draft 1 (n.d.). See supra note 41.
64 d. at 3.
6 Id. at4.
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Clark spent several more lines delineating the content of the
Ohio statute and the alleged crime for which Ms. Mapp was con-
victed. He was poised to treat the merits of her First and Fourteenth
Amendments claim, but failed to reach them. The draft trailed off. It
was never developed further. Perhaps Clark's recitation of the Cleve-
land police's tactics had been too much for him. Whatever the rea-
son, he had begun to transform Mapp into a state search and seizure
landmark.66
Clark's second role orientation, as noted previously, gave him
the option to overturn a case such as Wolf as soon as he could muster,
on an opinion so holding, the signatures of four other Justices. Could
he, with this in mind, use Mapp to extend the Fourth Amendment part
of Weeks to the states? Douglas would obviously agree. Warren and
Brennan were very good possibilities. Frankfurter, of course, would
never condone such an action. The chances of Harlan, Whittaker, or
Stewart supporting Clark were very small. If, then, there was a criti-
cal fifth vote, it belonged to Hugo Black. But Black had never en-
dorsed Weeks' extension to the states. Indeed, he had explicitly stated
in case after case that the exclusionary rule was not a part of the
Fourth Amendment. Black was, as Clark maintained repeatedly in
later years, "soft" on the Fourth Amendment. 67
66 Author Bernard Schwartz claims that Clark had decided to make Mapp into a search
and seizure case "just after the conference." ScHWARTZ, supra note 9, at 392-93. He suppos-
edly, at that time, turned to Black and Brennan, as the three of them rode the elevator after leav-
ing the conference room, "and asked, 'wouldn't this be a good case to apply the exclusionary
rule and do what Wolf didn't do?"' Id. at 393. "Under questioning by the others," according to
Schwartz, "Clark confirmed that he was serious and that he had, indeed, shifted his ground to
the Douglas position." Id. Schwartz did not identify his account's source or sources, although
he did interview all three of the justices who allegedly were involved in this exchange.
This initial draft of a Clark majority opinion found in his files, written in the Justice's
own hand, does tend to suggest, however, that several days, if not weeks, later, Clark still may
have been planning simply to decide Mapp on the obscenity issue.
Did he make such comments to Black and Brennan? In a series of seminars and inter-
views with the author, he never mentioned them. If he did volunteer them to his colleagues, was
he merely attempting to get a feel for Black's and Brennan's possible reactions? Definitive
answers remain elusive.
67 See Clark Interview, supra note 15.
Lucas Powe contends that Black's "softness" stemmed from "his Senate investigating
years." During that period, he had come to see "the Fourth Amendment as Wall Street's
amendment and therefore entitled to no respect." POWE, supra note 9, at 196.
Clark never propounded such a theory to the author. His stated belief was that Black
was far too weak on key Fourth Amendment protections because of his experiences as a youth
with his father's general store in rural Alabama. Occasionally, items on the shelves might be
stolen. Black, according to Clark's speculation, may have thus grown up wanting law enforce-
ment officials to have minimal restraints upon them when they conducted searches of suspects'
homes, barns, sheds, automobiles, and other possible hiding places. See Clark Interview, supra
note 15.
A prevalent and persuasive reason for Black's reluctance to view the Fourth Amend-
ment as expansively as Clark is based on Black's belief that the term "unreasonable" was so
vague as to afford the judiciary far too much discretion interpreting and applying it. Hence,
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Yet, he seemed the best chance. So, why not at least attempt to
persuade him? The first and second Clark full drafts, ones discarding
completely the obscenity issue, would not be sent to the Court's
printer. These typescripts would go only to Black.
C. Overtures to Black
How to convince Black? Clark focused upon this task during the
next two and one-half months as his opinion evolved. How could he
possibly find a doctrinal basis for extending an exclusionary rule to
the states that would appeal to a justice who had repeatedly denied
that the Fourth Amendment even contained one?
Clark turned to his clerks. They were to examine all possibly
relevant precedents. He wanted any statements that might help him.
The result was a large pile of slips of paper. Each treated one or a
couple of cases. They tended to fall into three categories. First, there
were the seemingly irrelevant ones; they appeared to contain "no
helpful language." Second, there were the potentially useful ones.
Third were what seemed to be the injurious ones.
An example from the first batch was the Court's latest case, Wil-
son v. Schnettler.68 The clerk's memo sketched it and dismissed it in
the following fashion: "Irrelevant case. Def[endant] had sought
inj[unction] from D[istrict] C[our]t against fed[eral] officer testifying
in st[ate] c[our]t as to what had been found on def[endant].
Def[endant] failed to allege that his arrest by fed[eral officer] had
been illegal, therefore, motion denied. 69
The second group was discouraging. It contained few cases. As
the third pile would show, the clerks had had little difficulty finding
opinions in which the Court had stated explicitly that Weeks was de-
rived solely from its supervisory powers. But they could not find a
single case that held, in no uncertain terms, that its exclusionary rule
was a part of the Fourth Amendment. The best they could do was to
argue that several cases at least suggested it.
If the Weeks doctrine was intended to be merely a rule of evi-
dence and was not a part of the Constitution, the clerks reasoned, was
it not "strange that it was not so described in any of the cases follow-
Black advocated a heavy dose of judicial restraint when a judge was called upon to give life to
it. See, e.g., SILVERSTEIN, supra note 18, at 213-16 (noting that in the 1940s and 1950s Justice
Black consistently voted narrowly to confine the Fourth Amendment under the reasonableness
standard).
6' 365 U.S. 381 (1961) (holding that an arrest and incidental seizure are lawful if officer
has probable cause for the arrest).
69 Note from Law Clerk to Justice Clark on Wilson v. Schneider 2 (n.d.) [hereinafter Note
from Clerk to Clark] (describing Wilson v. Schnettler, 365 U.S. 381 (1961)). See supra note 41.
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ing immediately on [Weeks'] heels? '70 Indeed, seven significant ones
71seemed to imply the opposite.
How slim such reeds were, however, is suggested by the clerks'
allusions to three additional cases. The latest ones that they thought
might help Clark's position were McNabb v. United States72 and Tru-
piano v. United States.
73
In the former, the Court, by means of a Frankfurter opinion, in-
voked its supervisory power to "knock out" a conviction because the
defendant had not been promptly arraigned, as required by federal
statutes, before a committing magistrate. Why was this case "signifi-
cant"? Because Frankfurter, when discussing the Court's supervisory
powers, had not cited Weeks. Instead, he had employed it when de-
veloping the proposition "that evidence obtained in violation of con-
stitutional liberties cannot be admitted at trial." 74 But was such a dis-
tinction really useful? Frankfurter had never wavered in his view that
the exclusionary rule rested solely upon the Court's supervisory pow-
ers. Everyone knew that.
Clark may well have found the recourse to Trupiano equally dis-
appointing. This complicated case involved, inter alia, whether fed-
eral agents had constitutionally seized contraband. The clerks men-
tioned it because Black, when concurring in a later case, United States
v. Rabinowitz,75 had said that Trupiano's "inarticulate premise" was
that the exclusionary rule was mandated by the Constitution.76 But
was it really useful to Clark that a justice who agreed strongly with
Frankfurter that the exclusion of evidence was not required by the
Fourth Amendment so alluded to Trupiano in a minority opinion?
The best case the clerks said they could find appeared to be the
third, Olmstead v. United States.77 Olmstead had not employed the
exclusionary rule, however. Instead, it had found by a five-to-four
vote that a wiretapping without a trespass was not an unreasonable
70 See id. (describing Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385 (1920)).
71 See id. at 1-4 (providing brief descriptions of these cases).
72 318 U.S. 332 (1943) (holding that when the confession of an accused was secured by
unlawful detention and continuous questioning for five to six hours without aid of counsel, the
confession is inadmissible).
73 334 U.S. 699 (1948) (holding that the fact that a valid arrest was made does not neces-
sarily render lawful a search or seizure without a warrant; such search must be required by in-
herent necessities of the situation at the time of arrest).
74 Note from Clerk to Clark, supra note 69, at 3 (describing McNabb v. United States, 318
U.S. 332 (1943)).
7' 339 U.S. 56 (1950).
76 Note from Clerk to Clark, supra note 69, at 4 (describing Trupiano v. United States,
334 U.S. 699 (1948)).
77 277 U.S. 438 (1928).
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search and seizure.78 Its majority opinion, the clerks nevertheless
proclaimed in caps, contained "EXCELLENT LANGUAGE IN
SUPPORT OF [THE] IDEA THAT WEEKS' EXCLUSIONARY
RULE IS CONSTITUTIONAL. 79
In Olmstead, Chief Justice Taft had stated for the majority that,
in Gouled v. United States,80 the Court had held that the admission of
unconstitutionally obtained evidence violated the Fourth Amendment.
Taft continued:
The striking outcome of the Weeks case . . . was the
sweeping declaration that the Fourth Amendment... really
forbade [the admission of evidence secured in violation of it
by government officers. In the] Weeks case.... this Court
decided with great emphasis, and established as the law for
the federal courts, that the protection of the Fourth Amend-
ment would be much impaired unless it was held... that the
evidence thereby obtained could not be received.81
But deployed against this useful Taft language were a dozen or
so cases, stretching from 1921 to 1960, in which the Court or individ-
ual Justices stated explicitly, or implied very strongly, that exclusion
was not mandated by the Fourth Amendment.
In United States v. Wallace & Tiernan Co.,82 for example, Jus-
tice Black, speaking for a unanimous bench, "clearly ... described
the exclusion rule as one of judicial origin to enforce the Fourth
Amendment ... ,83 And, of course, Jackson spoke for a large major-
ity when he took the same stand in Irvine. Perhaps the most poten-
tially damaging statement of all came from a justice writing for the
Court in United States v. Jeffers.84 Congress, he argued, had not in-
tended through recent legislation "to abolish the exclusionary rule
formulated by the courts in furtherance of the high purposes of the
Fourth Amendment. '85 "THIS LANGUAGE HURTS US," the clerks
pointed out, "BECAUSE IT SAYS THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE
78 See Ud at 438 (holding that since "no trespass was committed upon any property of the
defendants... the obtaining of the evidence and its use at the trial did not violate the Fourth
Amendment") (citations omitted).
79 Note from Clerk to Clark, supra note 69, at 3 (describing Olmstead v. United States,
277 U.S. 438 (1928)).
'0 255 U.S. 298 (1921).
8K Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 462-63.
'2 336 U.S. 793 (1949).
83 Note from Clerk to Clark, supra note 69, at 1 (describing United States v. Wallace &
Tiernan Co., 336 U.S. 793 (1949)).
' 342 U.S.48 (1951).
85 Id. at 54.
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IS COURT MADE AND IMPLIES CONGRESS CAN CHANGE IT,
AND PARTICULARLY, BECAUSE CLARK, J. SAID IT!,,
86
Perhaps even more serious trouble stemmed from Boyd v. United
States.87 Three decades before Weeks, Boyd had held that the Fourth
and Fifth Amendments ran "almost into each other." 88  These
Amendments, together, it found, were sufficient to bar the federal
government from compelling Boyd to produce certain papers.89
How did Boyd pose a problem? Citing both Boyd and Weeks, the
Court had ruled in cases like Agnello v. United States,9° that it was
"well settled that, when properly invoked, the Fifth Amendment pro-
tects every person from incrimination by the use of evidence obtained
through [a] search and seizure made in violation of his rights under
the Fourth Amendment."
91
The implications of such language were ominous. It assumed,
the clerks related, that the exclusionary rule rested on the Fifth, and
not the Fourth, Amendment. Hence, it could be inferred that if evi-
dence were not seized in violation of the Fifth Amendment, as it was
not in the Mapp case, it would be admissible. It was inconceivable
that the Court would consider the possibility of using Mapp to extend
the Fifth Amendment to the states. Moreover, Clark was a particu-
larly strong opponent of the self-incrimination safeguard's being ap-
plied at the state level. Yet, a conclusion that exclusion only attained
a constitutional stature when derived from the Fourth and Fifth
Amendments did seem "to stem from Boyd's obliteration of the divid-
ing line between the [two] Amendments. 92
This serious threat made the first draft of Clark's opinion to
leave his chambers especially audacious. He would not attempt to
ignore or distinguish Boyd. Nor would he dream of arguing that the
Fourth and Fifth Amendments together comprised a doctrinal basis
for an extension of the exclusion doctrine to the states. He would try,
instead, to employ just enough of Boyd's language to tempt Black.
No Justice superseded Black in championing the view that the Fifth
Amendment's right against compelled self-incrimination had been
86 Note from Clerk to Clark, supra note 69, at 1 (describing United States v. Jeffers, 342
U.S. 48 (1951)).
87 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
81 Id. at 630.
89 See id. at 616 ("When the thing forbidden in the Fifth Amendment, namely, compelling
a man to be a witness against himself, is the object of a search and seizure of his private papers,
it is an 'unreasonable search and seizure' within the Fourth Amendment.") (quoting from the
syllabus).
90 269 U.S. 20 (1925).
91 Note from Clerk to Clark, supra note 69, at 1 (describing and quoting Agnello v. United
States, 269 U.S. 20, 33-34 (1925)).
92 Id.
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"incorporated" within the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process
Clause. From Adamson v. California93 on, he had never wavered
from his stand that this protection applied, in full force, to state crimi-
nal justice. But could a somewhat general, yet pregnant, allusion to
Boyd attain the crucial Black signature?
Approximately three weeks after Warren had assigned him to
write Mapp, Clark sent his first typescript draft exclusively to Black.
It began with the observation that while, at the time of Wolf in 1949,
"almost two-thirds of the states" 94 opposed the exclusionary rule,
fifty-seven percent of those presently passing on it endorsed it. For,
Clark argued, experience had resoundingly refuted Wolf's assertion
that the Constitution's right against unreasonable searches and sei-
zures could be adequately protected at the state level through other
means.
95
Only last term, he noted, Elkins v. United States96 had barred
from federal courts all evidence secured by state law enforcement
9' 332 U.S. 46,89 (1947) (Black, J., dissenting).
94 Justice Tom Clark, Mapp Opinion Draft 3 (Apr. 22, 1961) [hereinafter Clark's First
Mapp Draft to Black]. See supra note 41.
5 See id. ("The experience of California that such other remedies have been worthless and
futile is buttressed by statistics from the City of Chicago where thousands of illegal searches and
seizures by police officers occur each year.").
96 364 U.S. 206 (1960).
Justice Clark's decision-making in the Elkins case was, to say the least, enigmatic-
even to him, when he reconsidered it almost a decade and a half later. See Clark Interview,
supra note 15.
In Elkins, through a Stewart opinion, the Court struck down the "silver platter" doctrine
whereby evidence seized unconstitutionally by state law enforcement officers was admissible in
federal prosecutions. See Elkins, 364 U.S. at 208. Stewart's reasoning-upon which Clark
would later draw heavily in Mapp-seemed to go a long way toward supporting Wolfs over-
turning. Stewart argued that federal courts encouraged state police to violate the Fourteenth
Amendment by permitting the fruits of such violations into evidence. See id. at 221-22. He
contended that the exclusionary rule seemed the only effective deterrent to unconstitutional
assaults upon privacy. See id. at 217. And he maintained that federal courts could distinguish
between the parts of federal search and seizure law that were and were not constitutionally
mandated--the very task that would be imposed upon the states if Weeks' exclusionary rule
were extended to them. See id. at 223-24.
Yet Clark dissented! He joined a Frankfurter opinion that contended that only the
"core" of the Fourth Amendment, not its entirety, had been extended to the states by Wolf. See
id. at 237-38 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). Like Frankfurter, he saw no evidence of what Stewart
had referred to as a "seemingly inexorable" movement on the part of the states toward the adop-
tion of the exclusion approach. See id. at 241-42. He was with Frankfurter in the view that
great difficulties would attend attempts by federal judges to determine which parts of federal
search and seizure law were constitutionally required. See id. at 243-45. Stewart, he agreed,
had not provided valid evidence that either federal or state law enforcement officials were abus-
ing the "silver platter" doctrine. The jury was still out, he agreed with Frankfurter, on whether
the exclusionary rule could effectively deter searches and seizures. See id. at 243.
Indeed, he seemed to believe so strongly in the "silver platter" doctrine that he could
not join Frankfurter in his suggestion that federal courts should reject evidence obtained uncon-
stitutionally by state police officers in states that did have exclusionary rules. He thus joined
Justice Harlan in the view that the "silver platter" rule should apply without exceptions, for it
had behind it "the strongest judicial credentials, the sanction of long usage, and the support of..
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officers in violation of the Fourth Amendment. Elkins had thus de-
stroyed whatever might have been left out of Wolf's doctrinal basis.
The Court could no longer permit "the double standard" whereby
state courts would still be permitted to use the fruits of unconstitu-
tional searches and seizures. To do so would only encourage continu-
ing illegalities whereby federal officials would provide their state
counterparts with unconstitutionally acquired evidence that they knew
was inadmissible within the federal court system. As cases like Olm-
stead and Elkins made clear, the perpetuation of such practices was
intolerable because it violated one of the administration of justice's
foremost precepts--"the imperative of judicial integrity." 97
In support of his contention that the Court could no longer per-
mit violations of citizens' rights against unreasonable searches and
seizures in any American court, Clark made his first allusion to Boyd.
That case, he contended, without even mentioning the Fifth Amend-
ment:
held that the doctrines of the Fourth Amendment "apply to
all invasions on the part of the government and its employ-
ees, of the sanctity of a man's home and the privacies of life.
It is not the breaking of his doors, and the rummaging of his
drawers, that constitutes the essence of the offense; but it is
the invasion of his indefeasible right of personal security,
personal liberty and private property."
98
Leaving Boyd, Clark then asserted that the Court had concluded
in Weeks that this "indefeasible right of personal security"99 could
. sound constitutional doctrine [in accordance with] our federal scheme of things." Id. at 252
(Harlan, J., dissenting).
Perhaps Clark dissented with Frankfurter, and later Harlan, because he believed that
Stewart, through his declaration that Wolf protected not only the "core," but the entire, Fourth
Amendment from state infringement, had changed the meaning of Wolf, sub silentio. Such an
action would fly in the face of his rule against overturning precedents by implication. In an
interview with the author, for example, Clark stated that he was not sure why he went the way
he did in Elkins, but that this explanation was "as good as any"! He remembered that Frank-
furter had written Wolf and had told him at the time of Elkins that Stewart was "manhandling"
it. Clark Interview, supra note 15. Of course, Clark had not hesitated to reject Frankfurter's
conceptions of both Wofand Rochin several years earlier in Irvine!
Or maybe Clark joined Frankfurter because he was convinced that the "silver platter"
doctrine was a simple rule that federal courts could follow, and that its elimination-before Wolf
was cashiered-would only induce substantial confusion into the law. Or, despite what he was
signing on to, perhaps he believed that keeping the "silver platter" rule would produce so many
anomalies in cases that it would only increase the pressure to overturn Wolf.
Whatever the reason or reasons for Clark's bizarre stand in Elkins, however, Clark went
on to vindicate many of Stewart's policy arguments he had rejected in that case, and to reject the
very ones of Frankfurter that he had so strongly endorsed in it only a year later in Mapp v. Ohio!
97 Clark's First Mapp Draft to Black, supra note 94, at 10.
98 Id. at 10-11 (quoting Boyd, 116 U.S. at 630).
9' Id. at 1I.
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only be protected through exclusion. "More than a mere rule of evi-
dence," the mandate of the Weeks case had always been clear. With-
out a "judicial implication" of a rule of exclusion, the Fourth
Amendment would be reduced, in Justice Holmes's term, to a mere
"form of words.' 1°°
It was thus high time, Clark concluded, for the Court to afford
the precious Fourth Amendment right of privacy the same level of
protection from state overbearing that it provided to other fundamen-
tal liberties. No longer could the Court permit it to be "revocable at
the whim of every policeman who, in the name of law enforcement
itself, chooses to suspend its enjoyment."10'
In this fashion, Clark ignored all of the language that cut against
him in cases like Wallace & Tiernan Co. and Irvine, not to mention
his own statement in Jeffers. And, on the basis of what he related, the
Fifth Amendment had not even been a factor in the Boyd case! How
would Black respond?
The rapidity of Black's response and Clark's attempt to accom-
modate it is indicated by the fact that the second, and significantly
revised, Clark draft was on its way back to Black just three days later.
"Dear Hugo," he wrote in his brief cover letter, "I hope this is better.
I have re-arranged and inserted new materials. [Thanks] for the sug-
gestions."'
1 2
This version moved Clark's Elkins argument to the front of the
opinion. Introducing few new contentions, it simply added consider-
able detail to those delineated by the first one. Significantly, how-
ever, its most provocative changes concerned Boyd. It was now in-
troduced on page three, rather than on page eleven. Once again,
Clark did not even mention the Fifth Amendment. But he added a
new line. The Boyd case, he contended, had declared that the con-
demnation of the Fourth Amendment encompassed "the illegal taking
of 'private papers to be used as evidence' and it specifically prohib-
ited the use of such [materials] as being 'unconstitutional." 0 3
This observation was inserted yet again as Clark argued that the
"double standard" regarding the admissibility of unconstitutionally
seized evidence in federal and state courts could no longer be toler-
ated. Wolfs failure to extend the exclusionary rule, although it "had
been recognized [as part] of the prohibitions of the Fourth Amend-
1'o Id. at 12 (quoting Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385,392 (1920)).
'o' Id. at 15.
102 Memorandum from Justice Clark to Justice Black (Apr. 25, 1961) (appended to Mapp
Second Opinion Draft, see infra note 103). See supra note 41.
103 Justice Tom Clark, Mapp Opinion Draft 3-4 (Apr. 25, 1961) (quoting Boyd, 116 U.S. at
630). See supra note 41.
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ment since Boyd," he concluded, "[was] bottomed on factual consid-
erations" that were no longer valid.'°4
Was Clark testing Black? Was he trying to see whether Black
would permit him to invoke Boyd without even mentioning its reli-
ance upon self-incrimination? He had upgraded Boyd's importance in
his opinion. But he had also taken a more explicit step toward retro-
actively transforming it-in relation to its exclusionary rule issue-
into an exclusively search and seizure holding. Would Black tolerate
it?
Apparently, he had led Clark to think so. For, three days later,
Clark's chambers took the dramatic step of circulating a Mapp draft
"for the Court" to all of the justices. Hence, in that brief period,
Black's signals had been sufficiently positive for Clark to have re-
vised his second typescript and to have had his third version run off
by the Court's printer.
This circulated draft contained a number of significant changes.
For the first time, Clark took his law clerks' advice to employ such
statements as Taft's in Olmstead and Frankfurter's in McNabb as part
of his argument that the rule of exclusion was embedded in the Fourth
Amendment.105 He again emphasized the obsolescence of the factual
grounds upon which he claimed Wolf had rested. By the time the
Mapp decision was pending, a majority of the states had voluntarily
opted for the exclusionary rule. But he also added the contention that
Frankfurter should not have even considered such factors in his Wolf
opinion. They were irrelevant, he argued, to a proper determination
of whether the rule of exclusion was inherent in the Fourth Amend-
ment, as it was visited upon the states through the Fourteenth
Amendment's Due Process Clause.
Toward the end of his opinion, Clark reiterated his conviction
that it made palpably good sense to bind both the state and federal
authorities by the same Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment strictures.
Such an approach, he contended yet again, would discourage federal
authorities from illicitly forwarding tainted evidence to their state
counterparts. But he now tried to buttress this position through the
inclusion of a sentence that was to become the most well known of
his judicial career: "There is no war between the Constitution and
common sense."
106
The circulated draft contained a heavy dose of new language that
must have appealed strongly to Justices such as Black and Douglas,
'04 Id. at 6.105 Justice Tom Clark, Mapp Opinion Draft 2-6 (Apr. 28, 1961) [hereinafter Clark's April
28th Mapp Opinion Draft]. See supra note 4 1.
'06 Id. at 12.
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given their belief that the Due Process Clause fully "incorporated" all
of the protections of the Bill of Rights. "Since the Fourth Amend-
ment has been incorporated through the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth," Clark argued, "it is enforceable against the States, in the
same manner and to the same extent as it is against the Federal Gov-
ernment. ' °7 Therefore, when the substantive protection of due proc-
ess was extended to all unreasonable searches and seizures, both state
and federal, Clark maintained, "it was logically and constitutionally
necessary that the exclusion doctrine-part and parcel of the Fourth
Amendment-be also transmitted as an essential ingredient of the
right newly recognized by the Wolf case.' 10 8
No revisions must have been as salutary for Black, however, as
those respecting the Boyd case. Once again Boyd had been upgraded.
It was now in the very first line of Clark's exegesis. For the first
time, he prefaced its quote on the "indefeasible right of personal secu-
rity" with the observation that, seventy-five years previously, Boyd
had found the Fourth and Fifth Amendments "as running 'almost into
each other." ' 1°9
Perhaps most significant of all, deep within the opinion, Clark
proclaimed that the Court had found that the Fourth and Fifth
Amendments enjoyed "an 'intimate relation' in their perpetuation of
'principles of humanity and civil liberty secured... only after years
of struggle,"' and that "the philosophy of each [was] complementary
to, although not dependent upon, that of the other-no man is to be
convicted on unconstitutional evidence."'
10
It is doubtful that Black could have expected more. Clark was
attempting to mold a relatively routine obscenity case into a search
and seizure landmark. The chances must have seemed nil that he
could also hold explicitly that the Fifth Amendment applied to state
prosecutions. As noted previously, he had always opposed the exten-
107 Id. at I0
los Id.
109 Id. at 2 (quoting Boyd, 116 U.S. at 630).
110 Id. at 11 (quoting Brain v. United States, 168 U.S. 532, 544 (1896)). Clark asserted in
later years that at the time of Mapp, Black did not want "to swallow the fourth amendment; he
wanted to bring in the fifth." Tom C. Clark, Some Notes on the Continuing Life of the Fourth
Amendment, 5 AM. J. CRIM. L. 275, 279 (1977). And so, he related, "we sat down and worked
in the fourth and had [it] and [the] fifth mentioned together." Id. "If you still do not understand
it," he quipped before an audience at the University of Texas School of Law in 1977, "I do not
either! But we overruled [Woo], and we started things moving the right way." Id.
Given Black's "blind spot" on the Fourth Amendment and his "soft" one for the Fifth,
Clark had told the author four years before, the Boyd language "went in there as a trade-out."
Clark Interview, supra note 15.
As this article makes clear, however, the Clark-Black exchanges on Boyd involved far
more complexities, subtleties, and maneuverings than the two Justices' merely sitting down
together and hammering out their compromise!
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sion to the states of its self-incrimination safeguard. And even if he
had possessed an inclination to extend it, at this point, Mapp's record
was barren of any Fifth Amendment claim. Surely at least one, if not
several, of the other members of his potential majority would have
balked at such an action.
Whether or not Black reacted positively, Clark was now circulat-
ing his opinion to all of the Justices. Yet, Black's guarantee of his
signature would not come until very late in the process. The Boyd
issue would simmer. It would remain in the background as Clark sent
successive drafts to his colleagues.
D. From Unanimous to Six-to-Three
Clark's second role precept, as we have seen, only permitted him
to overrule a precedent and establish a new one if he could secure the
signatures of at least four other Justices. Assuming that he would
eventually have Black's, he awaited the returns from the rest of his
circulations. They were not long in coming. From Earl Warren came
the simple note: "Dear Tom: I agree.'... "That is a mighty fine opin-
ion you have written," read the return from a delighted Douglas,
"Please join me in it."" 2 But the most complimentary response of all
came from Brennan. "Of course you know [that] I think this is just
magnificent and wonderful," he proclaimed, "I have not joined any-
thing since I came with greater pleasure."
' 3
The rest of the Court was hardly as jubilant. "Dear Tom," Potter
Stewart responded, "As I am sure you anticipated, your proposed
opinion in this case came as quite a surprise."'" 4 Stewart had to ques-
tion the wisdom of using Mapp as a vehicle to overrule a very impor-
tant doctrine so recently established and so consistently adhered to as
Wolf. "Without getting into the merits," he pointed out "that the idea
of overruling Wolf was urged in the brief and oral argument only by
amicus curiae."1' 5 It was not even discussed at the conference, where
everyone agreed, as he recollected it, that the judgment should be re-
versed on First Amendment grounds. "If Wolf is to be considered,"
Stewart concluded, "I myself would much prefer to do so only in a
11 Memorandum from Chief Justice Warren to Justice Clark 1 (May 2, 1961). See supra
note 41.
112 Memorandum from Justice Douglas to Justice Clark 1 (Apr. 29, 1961). See supra note
41.
113 Memorandum from Justice Brennan to Justice Clark I (May 1, 1961). See supra note
41.
114 Memorandum from Justice Stewart to Justice Clark 1 (May 1, 1961). See supra note 41.
115 Id.
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case that required it, and only after argument by competent counsel
and a full Conference discussion.'
11 6
John Harlan expressed the same reservations. But he went be-
yond them to sketch for Clark why he also considered the circulated
opinion incorrect on the merits. Harlan's letter prompted a rejoinder.
And the exchange between the two Justices seemed both to simplify
and to sharpen their perspectives.
"Dear Tom:" Harlan began, "I hope you will not mind my writ-
ing you candidly as to my concern over your opinion in this case."
117
He would have supposed that the Court would have had little diffi-
culty in agreeing, as he thought it had, that the Ohio statute contra-
vened the Fourteenth Amendment, in that it "impermissibly [deterred]
freedom of belief and expression, if indeed it [was] not tantamount to
an effort at 'thought control.', 11 8 With this in mind, Harlan could not
understand why Clark had chosen a ground for deciding Mapp that
was "not only highly debatable and divisive," but also required the
overruling of a decision to which the Court had "many times adhered
over the past dozen years.""
' 9
Clark's proposed overturning of Wolf was "both unnecessary and
inadvisable" for at least three reasons. First, it threatened "a jail de-
livery of uncertain, but obviously serious, proportions.' ' 20 Second, it
would "prompt much and perhaps confusing, writing among the
Brethren." 121 Third, allegedly derived from the Constitution, it hardly
received support from the rule that the Court should try to avoid con-
troversial constitutional issues.
Harlan did not think the time apropos for an extended discussion
of the merits of what Clark was holding. But "a few observations"
might be in order. At the outset, he seriously questioned the validity
of Clark's reasoning. He was not ready to find that Weeks was "con-
stitutionally based." Even if it were, there was no reason to conclude
that the Fourteenth Amendment carried it over to the states. Surely
Clark was not "suggest[ing] that the Fourteenth 'incorporates' the
Fourth as such. Wolf itself, let alone the uniform course of the
Court's decisions, have laid that ghost at rest."'2
According to Harlan, Clark had been inaccurate when he claimed
that Wolf's decision not to extend the exclusionary rule to the states
had rested upon "mere 'factual considerations' devolving from the
116 Id.
117 Memorandum from Justice Harlan to Justice Clark 1 (May 1, 1961). See supra note 41.
118 Id.
119 Id.
20 Id. at 2.
121 Id.
122 Id. at 3.
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circumstances that most of the States at that time had no 'exclusion-
ary' rule."123 "Rather," Harlan argued, "it most certainly [was prem-
ised upon] the fundamentals of federal-state relations in the realm of
criminal law enforcement." 124
"The upshot of all of this," Harlan concluded, "is that I earnestly
ask you to reconsider the advisability of facing the Court, in a case
which otherwise should find a ready and non-controversial solution,
with the controversial issues that your proposed opinion tenders."'' 2
"Perhaps you will have gathered from the foregoing," Harlan
quipped, "that I would not be able to join you in your present opin-
ion!"'1
26
Maybe Harlan re-read his letter and thought again about the seri-
ousness of the "incorporation" danger. Whatever the reason, he
added a penned postscript. "If you don't mind my saying so," he ad-
monished his colleague, "your opinion comes perilously close to ac-
cepting 'incorporation' for the Fourth A[mendment], and will doubt-
less encourage the 'incorporation' enthusiasts."' 127
Clark was apparently impressed, maybe even persuaded, by
some of Harlan's arguments, but not enough to be converted. In less
than three days, he forwarded to Harlan a detailed response. "You are
quite right," he conceded, "that the case might go off on the ground
that a conviction based upon mere possession of obscene material
without a showing as to dissemination would be impermissible."' 128
But Mapp also raised the Wolf question. Direct reference was made
to it by the opinion of the Ohio Supreme Court. Indeed, during the
conference discussion "three gave the latter as an alternative ground
for reversal."
129
123 Id.
124 Id.
125 1d at 4.
126 Id.
127 Id.
128 Memorandum from Justice Clark to Justice Harlan 1 (May 4, 1961) [hereinafter Clark's
May 4th Memo to Harlan]. See supra note 41.
129 id.
Had the search and seizure issue, as Justices Stewart and Harlan contended, not even
been discussed at the conference? Perhaps the answer depended upon how one defined "dis-
cussed at the conference."
In an interview with the author two decades later, Stewart maintained that he had "had
no inkling" that Clark would focus on the search and seizure issue until he received Clark's
circulated opinion. The threshold issue, if the Court were contemplating switching from the
First to the Fourth Amendment, he contended, would have been whether Wolfshould have been
reargued-a matter no one brought up during the Mapp discussion. See Stewart Interview,
supra note 18.
Clark's conference notes did indicate "that three unidentified Justices [had] said that
they were willing to base reversal on [the] '4th Am[endment] point."' Hutchinson, supra note 9,
at 200. Warren's notes, which contained a one-clause account of each Justice's position except
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It was also true that Wolf had been followed in several cases.
But in each case in which a full dress treatment resulted, it was in-
voked "grudgingly." Clark advised Harlan to see Irvine, "where Bob
Jackson indicated that it was not then time to overrule or change it,"
and Elkins, which "indicated that Wolf had muddied the waters."' 30
Clark was not worried about a "jail delivery." For defendants to
take advantage of the new doctrine, they would have needed to claim
at their original trials that the exclusionary rule applied to the states.
He imagined that "relatively few before or since Wolf would have
raised the point.' 131 Anyway, he observed, possibly predicting the
argument he would develop for the Court three years later in Linklet-
ter v. Walker,132 which held Mapp non-retroactive, "their attack
would be a collateral one which [would raise] other problems." 133
Clark conceded that his opinion, as those in all controversial
cases, afforded grounds for disagreement. But, he maintained, "I
have a court and therefore my theory at least has support."'134 "I
think," he continued, "the trouble stems from Wol which... enunci-
ates a constitutional doctrine which has no escape clause militating
against the present inexorable result."'35 According to Clark, "if the
right of privacy is really so basic as to be constitutional in rank and if
it is really to be enforceable against the states," then the Court may
not "carve out of the bowels of that right the vital part, the stuff that
his own and Black's, indicated that, of the seven tabulated (including Clark's) only Douglas
would "reconsider Wolf." Chief Justice Earl Warren, Conference Notes, The Earl Warren Pa-
pers (n.d.) (on file at the Library of Congress, Washington, D. C.).
Douglas' notes, however, may well be the most revealing. They initially parallel War-
ren's. He does have Warren's position-which was also that the Ohio statute was too vague and
broad, on First Amendment grounds. Douglas, however, unlike Warren, has Black reversing,
but does not indicate why. Of course, Black may well have said nothing more than that he
would vote for reversal.
Initially, then, Douglas has only himself as seeing an overruling of Wolf as another pos-
sible ground. But then, after also showing Brennan as convinced on the First Amendment issue,
he records him as saying that Mapp "is a candidate for overruling Wolf." Justice Douglas, Con-
ference Notes, The William Douglas Papers (n.d.) (on file at the Library of Congress, Washing-
ton, D. C.). "The officers," he relates Brennan as observing, had "no warrant-they go through
[the] cellar and find this stuff in [a] box belonging to someone else-rn would overrule Wolf."
Id.
After thus reporting Brennan's Wolfstatement, Douglas records both Warren and Clark
as suddenly agreeing with Brennan-as saying that they would vote to overturn Wolf too.
Whittaker and Stewart, according to Douglas, reverted back to the obscenity question. See id.
A conference discussion of Wolfv. Colorado? Certainly Douglas's notes indicate noth-
ing about a possible consideration of reargument. But, for him, as well as Warren, Clark, and
Brennan, overruling Wolf had, indeed, been "discussed" at the conference.
130 Clark's May 4th Memo to Harlan, supra note 128, at 1.
131 Id.
132 381 U.S. 618 (1965).
133 Clark's May 4th Memo to Harlan, supra note 128, at 1.
134 Id.
135 Id.
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gives it substance, the exclusion of evidence. ' 36 It was long recog-
nized and honored "as an integral part of the equivalent right against
federal action."
137
"Naturally I think, as I indicated in my concurrence in Irvine,"
Clark observed, "that the Weeks rule is a constitutional one." 138 He
believed the Court's opinions supported him. Even Wolf stated that
the exclusion doctrine was "a constitutional rule formulated by 'judi-
cial implication."', 139 Although Elkins did not pass on this question,
Clark felt that it too afforded much support for his view.
Clark did agree with Harlan that Wolf rested on the "fundamen-
tals of federal-state relations. ' 14° But the problem was that the statis-
tical trend Wolf used to defend the Court's abstention had now re-
versed. "All I say," Clark responded, "is that since Wolf made pri-
vacy a constitutional right enforceable against the states we are
obliged to enforce it as we do other basic rights-and that what, if
any, pressure the federalism concept brought to bear upon the judg-
ment in Wolf is now dissipated."' 141 "Quite frankly," Clark concluded
on this point, "I believe that the present result achieves a necessary
measure of symmetry in our... doctrine on both federal and state
exercise of those powers incident to their enforcement of the criminal
law which deal most directly with individual freedom and pose per-
haps its greatest threats." 142
"Nor do I believe, John," he added, "that the opinion is a wind-
fall to 'incorporation' enthusiasts." 143 "If it is," he contended, "then
Wolf brought it on."' 144 "However," he reassured Harlan, "I adhere to
all that is said in Palko [Palko v. Connecticut45 a landmark case
that repudiated the "incorporation" theory-] and will be glad to say
so if I am understood presently to be saying otherwise." 146 "I hope
you will restudy the opinion, John," Clark closed, "and find logic and
reason in it. If you have any suggestions I shall welcome them."'147
Harlan, however, could not possibly embrace such arguments.
The two Justices were on a collision course. Mapp's votes and opin-
ions were crystallizing.
136 Id.
137 id.
138 Id. at 2.
139 Id.
140 id.
141 Id.
142 Id.
143 Id.
144 Id.
145 302 U.S. 319 (1937).
146 Clark's May 4th Memo to Harlan, supra note 128, at 2.
147 Id.
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Nevertheless, and possibly as a result of this exchange, Clark had
made a number of significant changes in his draft when it was recir-
culated to the Court several days later. Harlan's warnings may well
have impelled him to tone down substantially statements indicating
that Mapp rested upon Black's "incorporation" theory. Whatever his
motivation, his recirculated opinion seemed to go out of its way to
part company with an explicit invocation of Black's doctrine. The
original draft had stated, for example, that since the "Fourth Amend-
ment had been incorporated through the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth," it was enforceable against the states in the same manner
and to the same extent as it was against the Federal Government. 148
The recirculated draft, however, began with a marked change of
phrasing: "Since the Fourth Amendment's right of privacy has been
declared enforceable against the states through the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth . ,,149 The outright "incorporation" lan-
guage in this and other places had been extirpated.
The recirculation at least began a reconsideration of the interplay
between the Fourth and Fifth Amendments in a way that Black would
welcome. Clark had lengthened his main quotation from the Boyd
case. Added to Boyd's account of how the Fourth and Fifth Amend-
ments protected the individual's "indefeasible right of personal secu-
rity" was the statement that "[b]reaking into a house and opening
boxes and drawers are circumstances of aggravation," but that "any
forcible and compulsory extortion of a man's own testimony or of his
private papers to be used as evidence to convict him or forfeit his
goods is within the condemnation" of both of these Amendments.
1 50
Yet toward the end of his opinion, he added language relating to
the Fourth and Fifth Amendments that Black could hardly have been
expected to appreciate. In the original draft, Clark argued that they
enjoyed an "intimate relation" in their perpetuation of "principles of
humanity and civil liberty. 151 Their common philosophy, which
Clark implied strongly was applicable at the state level through his
citation of Rochin, was that "no man is to be convicted on unconstitu-
tional evidence."''
52
The recirculated opinion, however, reflected an awareness that
such phrasing might be read as holding that Mapp was extending to
the states both the Fourth and Fifth Amendments. The corrective was
48 Clark's April 28th Mapp Opinion Draft, supra note 105, at 10.
149 Justice Tom Clark, Mapp Opinion Draft 12 (May 4, 1961) [hereinafter Clark's May 4th
Mapp opinion draft]. See supra note 41.
go Id. at 4 (quoting Boyd, 116 U.S. at 630).
's5 Clark's April 28th Mapp Opinion Draft, supra note 105, at 11.
52 id.
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a series of cumbersome lines attempting to make clear that the Fifth
Amendment did not bind the state judiciaries. Whatever protections it
provided the citizen, they were enforceable solely against the Federal
Government. At the state level, its interplay with the Fourth Amend-
ment was not relevant. Instead, the individual possessed "the free-
dom from unconscionable invasions of privacy and the freedom from
convictions based on coerced confessions."15 3 It was these two pro-
tections, therefore, that enjoyed the "intimate relation" that perpetu-
ated "principles of humanity and civil liberty." 154 And it was appar-
ently these safeguards, and not any stemming from the interaction
between the Fourth and Fifth Amendments, that at the state level re-
flected the philosophy that no man was to be convicted upon uncon-
stitutional evidence. Hence, Clark's attempt to root out anything that
sounded like "incorporation" also cut directly against Black's cam-
paign to extend the Fifth Amendment to state prosecutions.
Within a month, the first draft of Harlan's dissent was circulated.
It largely developed the arguments that his letter to Clark had pro-
pounded. The Court, he contended, should never have "reached out"
to overrule Wolf. Such a course was "not likely to promote respect
either for the Court's adjudication process or for the stability of its
decisions.155  Nor, as he had argued previously, was the opinion
sound on the merits. Harlan regretted that he found "so unwise in
principle and so inexpedient in policy a decision motivated by the
high purpose of increasing respect for Constitutional rights. 156 Un-
fortunately, however, Clark's voice had been one "of power, not of
reason."
157
With few significant changes, Harlan's dissent would win the
support of Frankfurter and Whittaker. Its argument against the
Court's "reaching out" to overturn Wolf would also be reflected in
Potter Stewart's and William Douglas' opinions in radically different
ways. Stewart would find it especially congenial. It reflected the
very concerns that he had communicated to Clark in his return. He
therefore joined it, but refrained from considering the merits of
whether the exclusionary rule should be extended to the states. He
agreed completely with Harlan that that momentous issue had, in no
way, been properly briefed and argued. He parted company with
Harlan, Frankfurter, and Whittaker, however, when they sought to
rebut Clark's treatment of it. He found it equally inappropriate for
153 Clark's May 4th Mapp Opinion Draft, supra note 149, at 11.
154 Id.
155 Justice John Harlan, Mapp Dissent Draft 6 (May 31, 1961). See supra note 41.
156 Id.
157 Id.
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him, or them, to consider it. Hence, he had no choice but to continue
to treat Mapp as an obscenity case. From that perspective, Ohio's
statute was clearly in violation of the First and Fourteenth Amend-
ments.' He was thus compelled to vote for reversal. Potter Stewart
would, therefore, be the only justice to emerge from Mapp where he
entered. He would be the only one of the original nine to rest his de-
cision upon Ms. Mapp's freedom of expression.
158
Through his concurrence, Douglas, on the other hand, defended
Clark against Harlan's "reaching out" argument. Mapp was an ap-
propriate case with which to overturn Wolf, he argued, because it
showed, as few others, "the casual arrogance of those who have the
untrammelled power to invade one's home and seize one's person."'
159
Moreover, it met all the technical requirements for such a holding.
The grounds for and against Wolfs overruling had been propounded
ever since it had been decided. They were no strangers to any of the
justices. 160
Clark's opinion would go through two more circulations during
the first week of June. They would, however, entail relatively minor
changes. Clark's rebuttal to Harlan's "reaching out" charge would be
similar to Douglas's. He would emphasize the many defendants since
1949 who had called for Wolfs overturning. He would add an ex-
plicit-and possibly fateful-statement that the main purpose of ex-
clusion was the deterrence of illegal police actions.' 6  Anticipating
what would be an onslaught of "law and order" criticism, he would
argue that the application of Weeks' standards to state law enforce-
ment officers would not inhibit their effectiveness. 62 But, for all in-
tents and purposes, the Mapp ruling had crystallized before Harlan's,
Stewart's, and Douglas's circulations.
"8 See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 672 (1961) (Stewart, J., memorandum) (statutory
provision was "not consistent with the right of free thought and expression").
159 Id. at 671 (Douglas, J., concurring).
160 See id. at 671 (Douglas, J., concurring) ("'The arguments of its antagonists and of its
proponents have been so many times marshalled as to require no lengthy elaboration here."')
(quoting Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206,216 (1960)).
161 See id. at 658 ("If the fruits of an unconstitutional search had been inadmissible in both
state and federal courts, this inducement to evasion would have been sooner eliminated."). This
assertion easily supported the opening of the Court's doors to holdings embracing deterrence as
the purpose of the exclusionary rule. See, e.g., United States v. Leon, 468 U. S. 897, 906 (1984)
(noting that the purpose of the exclusionary rule is not served in some cases where officers rely
on an invalid search warrant); Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 493 (1976) (deciding that the
effect of the exclusionary rule would not be diminished if search and seizure claims could not be
raised for federal habeas corpus review); Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 636-37 (1965)
(noting that the deterrent purpose of the exclusionary rule would not be advanced by applying it
retroactively).
162 Justice Tom Clark, Mapp Opinion Draft 17-18 (June 7, 1961). See supra note41.
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As the smoke began to clear, Clark had come a very long way
toward marshalling a largely routine obscenity case into a search and
seizure landmark. In the process, the Court's unanimity had been
shattered. The Justices seemed on their way to a six-to-three deci-
sion. But where exactly was Black? Would he, in fact, sign the opin-
ion? If he refused, Clark's entire holding might well explode. His
second role orientation would not permit him to overturn Wolf unless
he could induce four of his brethren to join him, through their signing
of his opinion.
E. Understandings
Black may well have been biding his time. He had sent Clark
neither a return nor a draft during over a month of the Court's Mapp
exchanges. Now, as the Justices were on the brink of their summer
recess, and as Clark's opinion appeared to be reaching a final form,
he responded. Clark was invited to examine in advance a typescript
of a possible Black concurrence. What he read must have shocked
him. "'[A]s I understand the Court's opinion in this case," Black had
written, we "now definitely hold that the Fifth Amendment's protec-
tion against enforced self-incrimination and the Fourth Amendment's
protections against unreasonable searches and seizures have been ex-
tended to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment."" 163
How to respond to such a contention? Somehow Clark had to
tell Black that he was very wrong while, at the same time, striving to
induce him to sign Clark's majority opinion. "As you know," he
delicately began his reply, "I certainly would not wish you to change
any statement of your understanding of the Court's opinion."164 "In
all fairness, however," Clark had to inform him that it was not his
opinion's intention impliedly to overrule Twining v. New Jersey,165
the main case holding that the Fifth Amendment's safeguard against
self-incrimination did not apply to the states. It was unnecessary to
consider Twining when deciding Mapp. Clark declared again that he
was "personally satisfied that the Fourth Amendment, standing alone,
[was] sufficient authority for a constitutional rule of exclusion." 166
His opinion had only drawn upon the Fifth Amendment "for analo-
gous support of that conclusion."' 167 There seemed no reason in law to
distinguish between "coerced real evidence and coerced verbal evi-
163 Memorandum from Justice Clark to Justice Black 1 (June 6, 1961) [hereinafter Clark's
June 6th Memo to Black] (quoting from Justice Hugo Black's draft opinion). See supra note 41.
6 Id.
16' 211 U.S. 78(1908).
166 Clark's June 6th Memo to Black, supra note 163, at 1.
167 Id.
432 [Vol. 52.401
MARSHALING MAPP
dence' 1" 6 when both were secured prior to trial by methods that of-
fended the Constitution. 'Testimonial compulsion at trial [was] not
involved in this case," however, and consequently, Clark had neither
cited nor considered Twining.169
As noted previously, Clark's third role orientation required him
to formulate new doctrines as clearly as possible. He was to root out
any ambiguities that might be expected to reduce their clarity. Never-
theless, his memorandum, while stating explicitly that Mapp was not
extending the Fifth Amendment to the states, also emphasized that he
did not wish Black to change any statement of his understanding of
the opinion.
Clark was thus posing a bargain. He would not use his opinion
in Mapp to rebut Black's Fifth Amendment contention if Black would
sign on. Clark's second role orientation was dramatically taking
precedence over his third. Marshalling a majority for his holding su-
perseded the imperative of doctrinal purity. He was willing, at least
for this particular case,170 to paper over Black's and his differences
concerning whether Mapp was "incorporating" the Fifth Amendment.
Black, too, was disposed to make concessions. But he was also
determined to use his leverage as the crucial fifth signature to induce
Clark to take a clear-cut "incorporation" position on at least the
Fourth Amendment. His memo of slightly over a week later con-
ceded that the facts in Twining and Mapp were so different "that they
could be distinguished on this basis.'' In a step that must have
given Clark enormous satisfaction, Black was dropping his Twining
contention.
Black, however, would not compromise the "incorporation" is-
sue. As we have seen, Clark had deliberately toned down a number
of initial passages in his opinion stating that the Fourth Amendment
had been "incorporated" within the Fourteenth Amendment's Due
Process Clause. Indeed, he had substituted for one of them the far
more ambiguous declaration that the Fourth Amendment's "right to
168 ld
169 Id.
170 In future cases, Clark and Black were to continue their battle over whether Mapp ex-
tended the Fifth Amendment's prohibition against compelled self-incrimination to the states.
See, e.g., Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 8-9, 21 (1964) (stating, in opinion joined by Black, that
the Fifth Amendment is incorporated into the Fourth Amendment; while dissent, joined by
Clark, states that it is not); Dorin, supra note 1, at 69 n.21 (describing the Malloy v. Hogan
dissent stating that Mapp did not hold that the Fifth Amendment was part of the basis to extend
the exclusionary rule to the states).
1 Memorandum from Justice Black to Justice Clark 1 (June 15, 1961) [hereinafter
Black's June 15th Memo to Clark]. See supra note 41.
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privacy" had been found to be "enforceable against the States through
the Due Process Clause."'
172
This set of changes, however, had greatly disturbed Black. He
therefore thought it made it necessary for him to say that his agree-
ment to Clark's opinion depended upon his understanding that Clark
read Wolf as having held-and that the Court was so holding in
Mapp---"that the Fourth Amendment as a whole is applicable to the
States and not some imaginary and unknown fragment designated as
the 'right of privacy.' 
173
'This understanding," Black continued, "is one of the reasons I
am willing to decide in this state case the question of the scope of the
Fourth Amendment as applied to the Federal Government. '' 74 "If I
am wrong on this," he noted ominously, "I am unwilling to agree to
decide this crucial question in this case and prefer to wait for a case
that directly and immediately involves application of the Fourth
Amendment to the Federal Government." 175
Black wanted to be understood clearly on this score. "In other
words," he emphasized, he was "agreeing to decide this question in
this case and [consenting to Clark's holding] as the opinion of the
Court" solely on the basis of Black's understanding "that hereafter the
Fourth Amendment, when applied either to the state or federal gov-
ernments, is to be given equal scope and coverage in both in-
stances."'176 "If this is not correct," Black concluded, "I think the case
should be set down for reargument as the dissenters suggest.' 177
For Clark, the worst possible development might well have be-
come a reality. He was, at the very last moment, possibly losing
Black. If he did lose him, the whole basis for his overruling of Wolf
disintegrated. Black was demanding an airtight commitment to the
"incorporation" of the Fourth Amendment. He was sending the mes-
sage that there was no other way, doctrinally, for him to join Clark's
opinion. But Clark had assured Harlan, in the most explicit language,
that his Mapp holding did not rest upon "incorporation." Indeed, he
had even offered to insert a citation from Palko v. Connecticut,78 the
Court's most anti-"incorporation" precedent, if there were any doubts
about it.
Harlan was now the leader of the dissenters, however, and
Black's was the crucial fifth signature for Clark's proposed Mapp
172 Clark's May 4th Mapp Opinion Draft, supra note 149, at 12.
173 Black's June 15th Memo to Clark, supra note 171, at 1.
174 Id.
'7 Id.
176 Id.
17 Id.
7 302 U.S. 319 (1937).
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opinion. Perhaps Clark had changed in his conception of the case in
the weeks since he had written Harlan. Or maybe he had forgotten
what he had assured him. Then again, he might have been confused
in his own mind about, 179 or did not even care, 80 whether Mapp
179 Such confusion may have lingered to trigger a bizarre episode in late June 1964 involv-
ing a Clark dissent, joined by Black and Stewart, in Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108 (1964).
A former Clark clerk during the term in which Mapp had been decided was appalled
when he read the slip opinion conveying Clark's dissenting commentary in Aguilar. It said,
citing Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 28, 39-40 (1949), and Harlan's dissent in Mapp v. Ohio,
367 U.S. 643, 678 (1961), that by 1958, the Court had "consistently held that the exclusionary
rule was not a Fourth Amendment requirement but one of evidence" under its "supervisory
powers:' For, Clark continued, it was not until Mapp in 1961 that the federal rule was held to
be a constitutional mandate and was, accordingly applied to the States. See Telephone Call
from Former Clerk to Justice Tom Clark's Law Clerks 1 (June 18, 1964).
Why was the former clerk shocked by these assertions? First, he noted, via a tran-
scribed June 19, 1964 telephone call to the Justice's present clerks, that they "directly contra-
dicted" the entire doctrinal exegesis of Part I of Clark's Mapp opinion-the gist of which was
that the exclusionary rule was regarded by the Court as a part of the Fourth Amendment as early
as Boyd in 1886, and most surely, as late as Weeks in 1914! See id. at 1. See also Mapp, 367
U.S. at 648-50.
Of the three page citations used to support these two sentences, he continued, "the first
was used in Mapp for the opposite proposition .... [the] second was only Mr. Justice Black's
view in Wolf, which [Justice Clark] ignored" in Mapp, and Justice Black abandoned in that case.
And the third was Justice Harlan's attack on Part I of Clark's Mapp holding! See Telephone
Call from Former Clerk to Justice Tom Clark's Law Clerks 1 (June 18, 1964).
The only "solution" to this "potential source of trouble," for the former clerk, therefore,
was for Clark to delete both contentions. See id at 2 ("Instead of changing language I would
delete both sentences."). But would Clark's fellow dissenters, Black and Stewart, agree to that?
And Aguilar had already "come down"--it had been officially promulgated. Was not the
Court's resolution of it now res judicata?
Apparently not for Clark! At least the slip opinion could be headed off at the pass-or
press-before publication in the United States Reports! "For the sake of clarity and to avoid
any ambiguity," he wrote the Reporter of Decisions, "I would like to have you eliminate a few
lines.' Memorandum from Justice Clark to the Reporter of Decisions 1 (June 20, 1964). See
supra note 41.
On page 118 ofAguilar v. Texas are these seriatim sentences: "The dissent in the case,
in commenting on the Court's holding that the complaint was invalid, said: 'The Court does not
strike down this complaint directly on the Fourth Amendment, but merely on an extension of
Rule 4,"' and "Since Giordenello [Giordenello v. United States, 357 U.S. 480 (1958)] was a
federal case, decided under our supervisory powers (Rules 3 and 4 of the Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure), it does not control here:' Aquilar, 378 U.S. at 118. The duo that Clark,
with his former clerk's assistance, had eliminated had been sandwiched between them.
180 Two terms after Mapp, Clark was still drafting opinions failing to resolve whether the
Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause "incorporated" the Fourth Amendment. His
April 9, 1963 circulation in Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 25 (1963), for example, was sufficiently
free of "incorporation" language as to inspire the following Harlan return: "Dear Tom: I agree
with your opinion, and think you have handled the Mapp problem with great artistry." Memo-
randum from Justice Harlan to Justice Clark 1 (Apr. 26, 1963). See supra note 41.
But his recirculated Ker opinion of May 7, 1963, which, under Black's urging, con-
tained an explicit "incorporation" interpretation of the Mapp holding, forced Harlan to with-
draw. "Dear Tom," Harlan wrote the following day, "I regret to say that I will not be able to
join your recirculation... which I read to embrace 'incorporation' in full-blown form.' Memo-
randum from Justice Harlan to Justice Clark 1 (May 8, 1963). See supra note 41. "I had
thought," he added, "that your original circulation handled the matter very well, and am sorry
that you felt constrained to depart from it." Id.
Along these lines, Justice Stewart told the author that Clark was far from a "constitu-
tional purist." Doctrinal questions of the greatest importance to a Black or a Frankfurter would
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rested upon "incorporation." Or he might have simply been willing to
tell Harlan and Black whatever they wanted to hear. Whatever
Clark's motivations, he did not re-insert the explicit "incorporation"
phrasing that had been in his draft-the one directly before the letter
from Harlan. His final opinion would continue to state that "the
Fourth Amendment's right of privacy [had] been declared enforceable
against the States.' 181  But he did author a note to Black that con-
veyed the direct antithesis of his earlier communication to Harlan.
"Dear Hugo," he replied the same day as Black's ultimatum, and only
four days before Mapp would be handed down, "the gist of the opin-
ion is that Wolf held the entire Fourth Amendment to be carried over
against the states through the Fourteenth."'' 8 2  Therefore, he assured
his colleague, "the exclusionary rule which Weeks applied to federal
cases must likewise be made applicable to state prosecutions.'' 183
Clark's and Black's last-minute understandings made it possible
for each to continue to use Mapp for his own purposes. Clark gained
the decisive fifth signature for the exclusionary rule's extension to the
states-an objective that he later said he had sought from the moment
he had taken his seat on the Court in 1949.184
be of far less consequence to him. Stewart remembered Clark as a "pragmatist," a problem-
solver on an ad hoc basis-one who was not especially concerned with building systems of law.
If a particular doctrine "got the job done," that was sufficient. Indeed, Stewart contended, he
knew of times when Clark, to get a signature, would add something to an opinion which directly
contradicted what was already in it-and what he allowed to remain there anyway. See Stewart
Interview, supra note 18.
181 Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U. S. 643, 655 (1961).
182 Memorandum from Justice Clark to Justice Black 1 (June 15, 1961). See supra note 41.
183 Id.
184 Clark repeatedly, in a variety of media, related a story reflecting upon why, from the
moment he became a justice, he had opposed Wolfs refusal to extend the exclusionary rule to
state searches and seizures. See, e.g., Clark, supra note 110, at 277-78 (discussing an illegal
search and seizure case he handled while practicing law in Dallas).
Perhaps these narratives were best captured by Fred Graham. "Emotionally," Graham
has recounted, "Clark had been deeply impressed by his first Federal Case, when, a twenty-
three-year-old beanpole in Dallas, he had undertaken to defend the son of his family's Negro
maid." GRAHAM, supra note 9, at 46-47. Police had ransacked the son's home, without a war-
rant. Ultimately, they found a jug of moonshine. They forwarded it to federal agents under the
Prohibition laws. Clark then "filed a motion to suppress the liquor ... on the ground that it was
obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment." Id. But under the "silver platter" doctrine, the
state officers could give the evidence to federal prosecutors. The trial judge, therefore, admitted
the moonshine "and irked at young Clark's effrontery, gave his client the maximum penitentiary
sentence." Id. The maid's son emerged "a chronic trouble-maker" who was ultimately convicted
of murder. Id. at 46-47.
"The injustice of it cut deeply into Clark's beliefs," Graham sensed during the interview
in which Clark had told him this story, and reported that, even many years later, Clark's "eyes
narrowed with remembered anger as he said that, 'I couldn't see then, and I can't now, any
reason why it made any difference which police violated the Fourth Amendment-the fruits of
the search shouldn't be admitted."' Id.
"My efforts here [in Mapp] were not explicitly triggered" by that case, wrote Clark,
four years after his Graham interview, to a college student who had asked him how he reached
his decision in the Mapp case. Letter from Justice Clark to Linda Skirvin 2 (Apr. 17, 1974). See
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Clark's, Warren's, Douglas's, and Brennan's silence permitted
Black to claim that Mapp was endorsing his long-held view that the
Fifth Amendment was "incorporated" within the Fourteenth Amend-
ment's Due Process Clause. "I am still not persuaded that the Fourth
Amendment, standing alone," he stated in his published concurrence,
"would be enough to bar the introduction into evidence against an
accused of papers and effects seized from him in violation of its
commands.
Reflection upon this problem since Wolf, however, had con-
vinced him that when "the Fourth Amendment's ban against unrea-
sonable searches and seizures is considered together with the Fifth
Amendment's ban against compelled self-incrimination, a constitu-
tional basis emerges which not only justifies but actually requires the
exclusionary rule." 186 Hence, he was joining the majority in its Mapp
holding. "As I understand the Court's opinion in this case," he con-
cluded, not revealing the views Clark, in his recent letter, had related
to him, "we ... set aside this state conviction in reliance upon the
precise, intelligible, and.., predictable constitutional doctrine enun-
ciated in the Boyd case."' 187
Clark's majority opinion began with his graphic account of the
Cleveland police's blatant violations of Ms. Mapp's right to pri-
vacy-a more detailed articulation of the facts that he had been relat-
ing a month and one-half before, when he may well have made the
decision actually to address Mapp's search and seizure.188 Then came
his somewhat ambiguous page-long allusion to Boyd, which gave
Black his foothold. 189
This phase largely behind him, he marshaled his quotations from
cases such as Weeks, Silverthorne, Olmstead, and McNabb to argue
that the exclusionary rule was inherently a part of the Fourth
Amendment. It was time to tackle the "factual considerations" that he
claimed underpinned Wolf s failure to apply Weeks to the states. Al-
though they were "not basically relevant" to the issue of whether a
supra note 41. "But my early experience [with it] did have some influence, I am sure. My firm
belief in the right of privacy, brought home to me during [this] early [episode,] played a definite
part in shaping my convictions." Id. The student, Linda Skirvin, was taking a Cornell Univer-
sity civil rights and liberties course taught by political scientist, David J. Danelski.
This account, of course, seems to clash dramatically with Clark's performance, just one
year before the Mapp case, in the "silver platter" landmark of Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S.
206 (1960). Yet, he apparently thought that this stark contradiction required no public explana-
tion!
Mapp, 367 U.S. at 661.
1 Id. at 661-62.
i Id. at 666.
18 See id. at 644-45.
189 See id. at 646-47.
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search and seizure rule of exclusion was within the Due Process
Clause, he did his best, relying heavily upon Elkins, to refute them. A
majority of the states now supported an exclusionary rule. Large ar-
eas of confusion in federal search and seizure law that had made
Frankfurter reluctant to extend it to the states in 1949 had now been
eliminated.' 9°
Since the Fourth Amendment's "right of privacy [was] enforce-
able against the States through the Due Process Clause," Clark ar-
gued, while not reinstating his initial "incorporation" language, it was
"enforceable against them by the same sanction of exclusion as is
used against the Federal Government."191 Only through such a rule
could law enforcement officers be effectively deterred from making
unreasonable searches and seizures.
This policy, he continued, would make "very good sense.
''92
For one thing, he argued with a heavy reliance on Elkins, it would
eliminate temptations on the part of the federal authorities illicitly to
make tainted evidence available to their state counterparts. Moreover,
Weeks' extension to the states could not be expected to result in a
diminution of police effectiveness. The federal judiciary, the Court
had observed in Elkins, had operated under Weeks for almost half a
century. It had not been suggested that either the Federal Bureau of
Investigation, specifically, had been rendered ineffective, or that the
administration of justice in federal courts, generally, had been dis-
rupted. 19
3
Clark again drove home his point that it was time for the Fourth
Amendment to no longer be treated as the Bill of Rights' stepsister.
His closing lines may have been revised to counter Harlan's accusa-
tion that, by "seizing the time," his Court had spoken only with a
voice of raw power. "Our decision," he proclaimed, "founded on rea-
son and truth, gives to the individual no more than that which the
Constitution guarantees him."' 194 It gives to the police officer, he
added, "no less than that to which honest law enforcement is enti-
tled." 95 And, to the courts, he closed, it bestowed "that judicial in-
tegrity so necessary in the true administration of justice."' 196
It had been critical to Clark to attain the precious words, "MR.
JUSTICE CLARK delivered the opinion of the Court," at the top of
what he had transformed into his landmark search and seizure opin-
'9o See id. at 647-50.
191 Id. at 655.
192 Id. at 657.
'9' See id. at 659-60.
'94 Id. at 660.
195 id.
196 Id.
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ion. For his second role orientation would not have permitted any
such holding to be prefaced by the phrase, "MR. JUSTICE CLARK
announced the judgment of the Court and an opinion in which THE
CHIEF JUSTICE, MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS, AND MR. JUSTICE
BRENNAN join."197
CONCLUSION
Justice Clark's contributions to the Court's decision-making in
Mapp were, to a significant extent, ad hoc, disjointed, ragged-
similar to the cyclone he described in relation to Gideon. Mapp's
development was thus less smooth and neat than has been suggested
by such accounts as those by Bernard Schwartz 198 and Dennis Hut-
chins on.199
In his important lead-up to Mapp, Clark's participation in Irvine,
he changed directions radically before he bound himself by the major-
ity's interpretations of two cases that were far from his favorites, Wolf
and Rochin. But when he finally sensed his chance to overrule Wolf
in Mapp, he scarcely hesitated in transforming the Mapp case from a
conventional piece of obscenity litigation into a landmark in search
and seizure.
Then his remarkable run with Boyd! It started with his clerks
telling him that Boyd's emphasis on both the Fourth and Fifth
Amendments was troublesome. Clark, nevertheless, took this poten-
tial pitfall and skillfully molded it into the bridge to Black's crucial
fifth signature. Boyd was sent through one avatar after another, as
Clark sought to win Black's support via the smallest possible conces-
sion on the self-incrimination issue. In so doing, he applied, at the
vortex of his opinion, a case that such contemporary students of the
Fourth Amendment as Akhil Reed Amar regard as one of the Court's
most important-and controversial-doctrinal passages. 200
197 The agreement between Clark and Black had been so fragile that, two decades later,
Justice Potter Stewart had thought that the case actually had come down as "MR. JUSTICE
CLARK announced the judgment of the Court and an opinion in which THE CHIEF JUSTICE,
MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS, AND MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN join." He recalled that it was
obvious to everyone at the Court at the time that Black and the other four were, in no way, shar-
ing a common ground on the self-incrimination issue. He was thus amazed, when informed
otherwise, that Clark had still been able to persuade a purist like Black actually to sign his opin-
ion. See Stewart Interview, supra note 18.
198 See SCHWARTZ, supra note 9, at 393-98 (discussing the development of Mapp from
Clark's original draft of Apr. 22, 1961).
199 See Hutchinson, supra note 9, at 198-202 (discussing the development of Mapp from
oral argument on Mar. 29, 1961).
2w See AKHiL REED AMAR, THE CONSTITUTION AND CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: FIRST PRIN-
CIPLEs 62-65 (1997) (discussing later attempts to overrule Boyd).
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Then the seemingly epic battle between Black and Douglas, on
the one side, and Frankfurter and Harlan, on the other, over "incorpo-
ration." In case after case, they fought on. Law professors from both
camps clashed in countless tomes and articles. Yet Clark seemed not
to care so very much. Harlan wanted some "absorption" language?
Clark would try to oblige. Black demanded more along the "incorpo-
ration" line? Clark would see what he could do. Neither of these
theories had unquestioned credentials. He thus intimated one when it
seemed to help him. He would imply the direct opposite with the
other when that appeared like a good idea. Stewart found the Clark
opinion in Mapp to be far too "result-oriented." With four other sig-
natures on his opinion, he seemed willing to establish almost any-
thing. 201 Clark thought that sometimes Stewart was out of bounds; he
overruled too many cases sub silentio.202
What was judicial duty and what was improper activism de-
pended upon each justice's role conceptions. All of them constantly
had to play off of each other's approaches. For Clark, in particular,
the decisive influence upon how he untangled an Irvine or a Mapp
seemed to be the interplay of his three role precepts. Time and time
again, when his initial positions in cases seemed especially fluid, his
juggling of their imperatives seemed to crystallize his decision.
From all of this, when Clark sensed that the time was right, he
"reached out" to decide Mapp v Ohio. He would not seek full argu-
mentation. He would not walt for a selection of cases, as in Brown v.
Board of Education20 3 before Mapp, or in Miranda v. Arizona204 after
it. Windows of opportunity usually shut quickly. In 1961, therefore,
there would be no compilation of both "home" and "street" cases.
Frankfurter, Harlan, Whittaker, and Stewart protested, but Clark went
ahead anyway-most properly acting, as he saw it, in accordance
with his second role principle.
The result was a landmark proclamation that even incontestably
reliable evidence should be, in the great majority of state prosecu-
tions, barred from trial if it had resulted from an unreasonable search
or seizure. And this "cyclone" seemed destined to play itself out-in
seemingly endless contexts-the product of the development of
phrasings and intimations, through give-and-takes relating to draft
after draft of opinions, that constituted the great part of Tom Clark's
judicial life.
201 See Stewart Interview, supra note 18.
202 See Clark Interview, supra note 15.
203 344 U.S. 1 (1952).
204 384U.S.436(1966).
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